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Reservoirs and Reservations
Karen M. Griffin

In the late 1930s and 1940s. the Army Corps of Engineers was heavily involved in the development plans for a number
of large dams located throughout the country. Many of these dams. and the reservoirs they created. have either been
situated on Native American reservations or have had direct impact on reservations. This paper proposes that while
the original intent of these dams was to benefit a number of people. there may have been those who saw dams as a
convenient tool in the fight to terminate and assimilate the Native American population. Evidence regarding two of
these projects. the Kinzua Dam on the Allegheny River and the Pick Sloan Project along the Missouri River evidence
has been detected to support this hypothesis. In both cases the Native Americans were neither informed of the
dramatic changes which would effect their lives. nor were they included in any of the discussions concerning these
dams. All the tribes faced enormous opposition from the government. which resulted in costly and long-term legal
battles an.d for some. the possible termination of their tribe.
Many of the major dams found in the United States today
were planned in the late 193's, 40s, and 50s by the Army
Corps of Engineers. The 1940s and '50s is also known
as the period of termination for many Native tribes. This
paper propses that dams, and specifically the reservoirs
they create, became a useful tool in the fight to terminate
Native American tribes either through direct termination
or by more subtle approaches in the destruction of their
reservations and communities.
While many would argue that dams were designed only
to provide hydropower or control flooding problems,
there can be little dispute that a large number have had
direct and indirect effects on tribal lands and tribal
people. There are some 17,537 reservoirs and
impoundments alone on lands under BIA jurisdiction
(Reddy 1993). These cover 507,139 surface acres of
tribal lands (Reddy 1993:Table 1). Much of the land
covered has been the prime land on the reservations.
Homes, the best of the agricultural land, timberlands,
sacred religious sites and numerous cemeteries have all
been inundated by the waters of the reservoirs. Often the
tribes were not even aware of the plans for the
development of the dams until it was too late to stop the
construction and the consequent devastation to their
reservations.

IMPACTS OF RESERVOIRS
Dams and reservoirs have an enormous impact on the
lands on which they are built. They substantially alter
the courses of rivers, submerge large tracts of land,
hamper or altogether destroy wildlife, trigger
earthquakes, create breeding grounds for infectious
diseases. and often inundate lands occupied by people.

However, the effects on the land are not the only, nor the
most damaging, effects. The social-cultural effects as ~
result of relocation and resettlement can be far more
damaging and long-term.
The most easily and widely used measures of impacts are
usually in economic terms. Economists can easily
measure the possible economic loss of agricultural lands
or businesses within a given area.
Yet. little
consideration has been given to socio-cultural effects of
relocation and resettlement. The forced relocation and
resettlement of people has been shown to produce
instability in the political structures of communities, the
split up of kinship groups and in some cases of nuclear
families, increased infant mortality rates, increased
divorce rates, increased health problems. increased
unemployment rates and a number of other problems.
And invariably, these people who have been forced to
relocate rarely receive any direct benefits such as the very
electricity these dams produce (Colson 1971: Dr. Robert
Hitchcock, personal communication, 1996).

THE SENECAS OF THE ALLEGANY
RESERVATION
In 1794, George Washington signed a treaty with fiftynine sachems and war chiefs of the Iroquois Nations
providing them with reservations in the New York and
the Pennsylvania area. This treaty, signed by George
Washington, and known as the Pickering Treaty stated:
"Now the United States acknowledge all the land within
the aforementioned boundaries, to be the property of the
Seneka nation: and the United States will never claim the
same, nor disturb the Seneka nation ... but it shall remain
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theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of
the United States. who have the right to purchase."
Even before this treaty, in 1791, Cornplanter, the great
Seneca war chief, had granted to him and his heirs "in
perpetuity" three tracts of land by the state of
Pennsylvania for his service in protecting American
settlers and keeping the peace between the Senecas and
the Americans (Josephy 1968). Two of these tracts
Cornplanter later sold, but he retained a 908 acre tract
for himself and his descendants. When he died in 1836.
Cornplanter was buried on this tract of land along the
Allegheny River, and in 1866 the state of Pennsylvania
erected a stone monument over his grave.
But this tract of land had even further significance for the
Seneca for it was on this land that Handsome Lake,
Cornplanter's half-brother, had his first revelation.
Handsome Lake was considered a prophet by the Iroquois
people and his new religion was quickly adopted by many
of the Iroquois. It is still practiced and evident in
Iroquois life today. The Iroquois consider this land to be
sacred ground with deep religious significance.
The Senecas have lived on their reservation land since
the 1794 treaty with only occasional interferences by the
US government for things such as mandatory public
education for children. But in the 1950s, things were to
change drastically for the Senecas along the Allegheny
River. In 1957, the US Army Corps of Engineers began
to act on a 1938 plan to construct a dam to control the
flood waterS of the Allegheny River and to provide the
city of Pittsburgh with additional electrical power. The
project was known as the Kinzua Dam (Josephy 1968).
The Kinzua Dam, 179 feet high and almost 1,900 feet
long, would eventually cost $120 million to construct
and created a reservoir 35 miles long (Josephy 1968;
Abrams 1976; New Republic 1964). This reservoir
inundated over 10,000 acres of the 30,469 Allegheny
Reservation, including Cornplanter's tract where his
grave and monument resided, and forced the relocation
of 700 Seneca people (Abrams 1976; Christian Century
1964). And while approximately 20,469 acres may seem
to be a substantial portion of land, this was not the case.
The leased town of Salamanca, New York, roads and
railroads and other small towns occupied by whites on
the reservation occupied nearly 12,000 acres. The
remaining land was rocky, steep, forested hillside which
was unsuitable for building homes.
The land flooded by the reservoir was the most fertile
land of the reservation and also the best hunting grounds
for the Senecas, a crucial factor for a people who still
partially lived on subsistence hunting (The Economist
1962). It also provided the Senecas wood for fuel and
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clear, cold water wells and springs. With relocation due
to the dam, the Senecas would be forced to pay for fuel
and municipally supplied, chlorinated drinking water
(Senior Scholastic 1964).
But this land was more than just a place to live and hunt.
It had greater meaning and significance for the Seneca
people, including its sacred status in relation to the
prophet Handsome Lake. Anthropologists Stanley
Diamond, William Sturtevant and William Fenton stated
in a memorandum submitted to the Subcommittees on
Indian Affairs in 1964 on the Seneca reservation:
No matter how crude living and other facilities may be in fact,
the reservation itself is a home and a shelter, and the most
tangible symbol of Indianess, both for those now living there
and for many tribe members temporarily living elsewhere. In
this, Indians differ from other citizens, including other minority
groups, for whom the specific land they occupy is of far less
cultural and psychological significance. The reservation is,
however, not merely a repository of a dwindling heritage. It is,
also, a society in which new possibilities of Indian cultural
expression struggle to establish themselves. (Diamond et al.
1964:632).

The area to be inundated by the reservoir was not only
occupied by the homes of the Seneca people, it also was
where their ancestors were buried. Some 3,000 graves
would have to be relocated, among them the grave of
Cornplanter (Josephy 1968).
All of this would have been difficult enough for the
Seneca people to endure, but to make matters worse the
manner in which the Seneca people were treated
throughout the planning and construction of the dam
added insult to injury. When the Army Corps of
Engineers requested authorization for the building of
Kinzua Dam in 1938 and again in 1941, they had not
bothered to either inform the Seneca people nor consult
with them. In fact, the Army Co~ of Engineers did not
even bother to mention that the dam would break one of
the oldest US treaties in existence when they gave their
presentation to Congress (Josephy 1968).
The Senecas were further deceived in 1955 when
engineers arrived on the reservation supposedly to
conduct surveys, telling the Senecas that they were not
even sure that this was where they wanted to locate the
dam (Josephy 1968). In 1956, Congress appropriated the
funds necessary to construct the Kinzua Dam. The
Senecas learned afterwards that hearings were conducted
in which the engineers testified; Senecas were neither
invited nor informed (Josephy 1968).
In reaction to the appropriation of funds, the Senecas
sought an injunction to halt the construction of the dam.
They also hired two outside engineers to review the
Kinzua Dam and to see if there was an alternative to the
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location. Dr. Arthur E. Morgan, the former chairman of
the Tennessee Valley Authority and former president of
Antioch College and Barton M. Jones, the builder of the
TVA's Norris Dam were hired by the Seneca tribe. Dr.
Morgan made it clear to the Senecas that "should he find
that Kinzua was essential to the protection of a great city
like Pittsburgh, he would advise them not to object-and
they agreed" (Taylor 1% 1).
Dr. Morgan and Mr. Jones found that there was in fact
an alternative solution to the construction of the Kinzua
Dam. In a letter to President Kennedy dated March 16,
1%1, Dr. Morgan wrote:
In fixing on the Kinzua Dam site more than thirty years ago, the
C01l>s of Engineers made a colossal blunder or oversight in
failing to discover the Conewango-Cattaraugus site, with
diversion of excess flood waters into Lake Erie. As compared
with Kinzua, choice of the Conewango-Cattaraugus location
would save the Seneca Indian reservation, would protect
Pittsburgh from twice as great a flood as would Kinzua, and
would entirely remove Upper Allegheny flood water from the
Ohio, thus saving the need for spending probably more than
$100,000,000 for additional reservoirs; and especially,
Conewango Reservoir with its vast capacity would make
possible the storage of three times as much water as would
Kinzua for increasing low water flow in the Ohio River-and
all this at less cost than Kinzua (Taylor 1961: 121).

Dr. Morgan's alternative plan, even when shown to be
more beneficial, was not accepted by President Kennedy
or Congress. The Corps of Engineers claimed it would
be more expensive and that it could not provide the
recreational opportunities that the Kinzua Dam could.
The Corps had strong political support from members of
Congress and strong allies of President Kennedy; as a
result, the Senecas lost (Josephy 1%8).
But the Seneca's plight did not end there.
The
encroaching waters of the reservoir began to rise and
were close to flooding the homes of the people, although
they had not yet received any funding from the federal
government which would allow them to relocate.
However, the railroad, which also faced some relocation
of tracks, received $20 million without delay (Christian
Century 1964).
According to House Resolution 1794. the Senecas were to
receive $16 million for the damage and relocation forced
on them by the construction of the Kinzua Dam. The
resolution passed the House of Representatives but stalled
in the Senate. The Committee of the Interior slashed the
budget to $9.123,000, even though there was adequate
proof justifying the amount of $16 million. A rider
attached to the resolution required the Senecas to submit
within two years a plan for termination of their special
relationship to the federal government (Christian Century
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1964). The Senecas believed that the termination rider
was linked with the compensation bill to force them to
terminate (Christian Century 1964). If they refused the
resolution altogether, they would lose not only their
homes but the means to acquire new homes.

The Senecas eventually received $5,466,615.04 with
$546,661.50 going to legal fees (Abrams 1976). In 1965,
they went to court again to halt the construction of a
four-lane highway through the remainder of their
reservation land. Once again, they lost. and their land
was further reduced.

THE PICK-SLOAN PROJECT
The most detrimental dam project to Native Americans
in the United States is undoubtedly the Pick-Sloan
Project. Situated on the Missouri River, the Pick-Sloan
project consists of a number of large dams located
primarily in the Northern Plains. The purpose of the
Pick-Sloan project was to control flooding, produce
hydropower, and increase navigation trade. But this
project came at a great cost to the many reservations
which bordered the Missouri River.
In total, twenty-three different reservations were affected
by the Pick-Sloan project (Lawson 1982). Three of the

dams alone flooded 202,000 acres of Lakota land
(DeLoria 1994) (see Table 2). All of the reservations
combined lost a total of 353,313 acres for reservoir
storage (Department of the Interior 1954) and a total of
and more than 900 Native American families had to be
relocated (Lawson 1982). The heaviest damage to a
single reservation was inflicted upon the Three Affiliated
Tribes (Mandan, Arikara and Hidatsa) of North Dakota.
Their entire reservation life was disrupted by the
Garrison Dam and the huge reservoir that would form
behind it.
The Fort Berthold Reservation, home to the Three
Affiliated Tribes, was the first to deal with the PickSloan project. The people of this reservation lived
predominantly on the bottomland along the Missouri
and, as a result, they suffered the greatest devastation to
their community and way of life. The Three Tribes were
successful ranchers and farmers whose means of income
depended on the lands on which they lived. They lost
94% of their most productive land-in total, 152,360
acres-and over one-fourth of their total land base
(Lawson 1982). These lands were submerged beneath
the waters of the reservoir created by the 212-foot-high
Garrison Dam. However, without Congress' approval.
the Corps modified the construction of the dam, reducing
the height to avoid flooding the predominantly White
town of Williston. North Dakota.
25

Grifftn

Some 349 families, approximately 80 percent of the tribal
population as well as the agency center, had to be
relocated (Lawson 1982). The community life for these
people, who relied heavily on kinship groups and other
primary groups was destroyed. Some people moved to
urban areas where they lived a life of despair. Among
these previously successful ranchers and farmers,
unemployment rose to 79 percent (Lawson 1982).
Like the Seneca tribe, many of the Native nations along
the Missouri were unaware of the plans that were to
affect them until it was too late. The Missouri Basin
States Committee (MBSC), a group composed of
representatives from the Bureau of Reclamation, Corps of
Engineers, business people in the Upper Basin, and
government representatives from the states of South
Dakota, North Dakota, Wyoming, Montana, Nebraska
and later Kansas, Missouri and Iowa formed a permanent
coalition to push for a water development program for
the Missouri River (Schneiders 1996). This group
supposedly was to represent a broader political and
economic perspective on the project, and yet not one
Native American was invited to become a member to
represent the interests of the Native Americans, the
group of people who would be most drastically affected
by the proposed project. Even when the MBSC held
public forums in cities all along the Missouri to inform
the people of the proposed project, not one forum was
ever held on any of the reservations for the sake of the
Native Americans (Schneiders 1996).
The Three Affiliated Tribes tried to negotiate with the
Corps of Engineers and the government to compensate
them for the great loss they were to suffer. They
originally requested an equivalent amount of
compensatory land, 20,000 kilowatt-hours per year of
electricity, permission to graze and water their cattle
along the margins of the reservoir, and first rights to the
timber which the reservoir would flood (Reisner 1986).
In the end, what they received added insult to injury.
The tribe received only $5,105,625 for their lost lands
which calculated out to a mere $33 per acre.
Furthermore, they could not water their cattle along the
reservoir nor fish, hunt or use the reservoir for any other
purposes, they were forbidden to use any of their funds to
hire attorneys to fight for further compensation, they
would not be given any free electricity and they could not
even harvest the timber that was. flooded by the reservoir
(Lawson 1982; Reisner 1986). They were able to seek
further compensation through Congress, where they were
eventually awarded another $7.5 million; this brought the
entire settlement to $12,605,625, well below the $22
million the Three Affiliated Tribes felt was a fair market
price (Lawson 1982).
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The next reservation to succumb to the Pick-Sloan
project was the Yankton Reservation. The Corps of
Engineers apparently was aware of the lack of
organization on this reservation and quickly set out to
condemn thirty-one tracts of land on the reservation. A •
move that was illegal and which violated the Yankton
Treaty of 1858 and also disregarded legal precedents
established by the Supreme Court (Lawson 1982). Not
only did the Corps illegally confiscate the land, but upon
deposit of $132,324 in the federal district court, the .
Corps took immediate possession of the land and charged
rent to the 19 families still living on it (Lawson 1982).
The Yankton Lakota, unaware of their rights, did not
challenge the action and the district court magistrates
apparently did not do thorough research regarding other
legal decisions. It would take six years ~fore the
yankton people would receive any additional
compensation for their forced resettlement.
By the time the Oahe Dam was scheduled to begin
construction, William Zimmerman, Jr., Acting
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, took action to provide
the Native people with more humane treatment in
regards to their resettlement process. Senator Chan
Gurney and Congressman Francis Case of South Dakota
introduced legislation which would establish legal
guidelines in the facilitation process and which would
require the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Army Corps
of Engineers to work together to reach a settlement
similar to that of the Fort Berthold agreement (Lawson
1982). In September of 1950 the bill was passed
requiring both the Corps and the secretary of the interior
to work with representatives from the various tribes. The
bill also required that settlement not only cover the cost
of land but allow for improvements and relocation of the
people "so that their economic, social, religious, and
community life can be reestablished and protected" (Act
of 30 September 1950).

While this act was a step in the right direction. it did
ignore some serious concerns. It did not set aside any
electric power for the exclusive use of the tribes.
requiring the native people to purchase electricity at the
same rate as rural cooperatives and public bodies.
Congressman Case pointed out that this cost would be so
detrimental to the tribes that it would negate any
compensation they may receive. The law also did not
provide any legal compensation for the tribes nor did it
resolve the question of shoreline access rights (Lawson
1982).
The Cheyenne River, Standing Rock Lakota, Lower
Brule and Crow Creek tribes were determined to receive
better settlements than the Fort Berthold tribes and the
yankton Lakota. This battle would take much longer

VoL 13, No. 1,1996-1997

and was much harder than they had anticipated. The
tribes attempted to hire outside. attorneys to assist them in
their battle for fair negotiation settlements. Even this
proved to be a difficult task. The Standing Rock tribe
sought to hire an attorney using their own tribal funds.
The tribe wanted to hire an attorney who could represent
them throughout the negotiations no matter how long
they took. They sought the services of James E. Curry, a
Washington attorney who was known to be extremely
critical of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. But Indian
Commissioner Dillion S. Myer, a bitter enemy of Curry
and former administrator of the Japanese internmentcamp program, refused to approve this action and instead
would only allow a one-year contract. Myer also refused
Curry's contract with the Crow Creek Lakota as well as
12 other tribes (Lawson 1982). For his actions on this
matter, Myer received strong support from many people
in Washington, including members of the Senate Indian
Affairs Subcommittee. The Standing Rock tribe made a
formal protest to Interior Secretary Oscar Chapman who
dragged his feet for some time before making any
decisions. It was not until a contingent of the tribes
camped for 26 days outside of Chapman's office that he
finally rendered a decision. He sided with the Lakota
and approved an important decision for all Native people
in the US: that they could hire their own attorneys and
make their own contracts with the attorneys.
But Myer retaliated by controlling the purse strings of the
B.1.A. He would only allow the Standing Rock tribe to
use $300 per year for legal fees, thereby almost
destroying any means for competent legal representation
for the tribes. Furthermore, Myer blocked other attempts
by the tribe to hire outside attorneys. In the end, the tribe
felt compelled to hire an attorney which Myer approved.
They had to settle for M.Q. Sharpe, former governor of
South Dakota and a strong supporter of the Pick Plan in
the 1944 congressional debate (Lawson 1982).
Obtaining fair settlement terms from the Army Corps of
Engineers was nearly impossible for the tribes, and most
of the tribes eventually took their cases to the courts to be
settled. The Cheyenne River tribe eventually received
$10,644,014 for their lost land and forced relocation
however. this was $13 million less than originally
requested. And while they did retain all salvage, mineral
and shoreline rights, they did not receive a block of
hydroelectric power nor exclusive shoreline recreation
facilities rights.
Furthermore, Congress denied the
federal trust status to lands purchased outside the
reservation as substitution for the inundated lands and
final authority for disbursement of funds was given to the
Secretary of the Interior, not the tribal council (Lawson
1982).
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The yankton Lakota received $106,500 in addition to the
$132,324 paid by the Army Corps of Engineers. The
yankton tribe received the same shoreline rights as the
Cheyenne River tribe but the mineral rights were reduced
to gas and oil only. Furthermore, the Yankton Lakota
were unable to secure rehabilitation funds which would
have helped them improve the social and economic
situation for the entire tribe.
The Crow Creek, and Lower Brule faired somewhat
better than the yankton tribe. The Crow Creek tribe
settled for $4,366,802 and the Lower Brule settled for
$3,194,465 with additional rights similar to those
granted to the Cheyenne River tribe (Lawson 1982).
Even though the Standing Rock tribe sustained less
damage than the Cheyenne River tribe or the Fort
Berthold tribe, they faired much better in terms of
settlement.
In the end they eventually received
$12,346,553 in funds along with some additional
benefits. Their settlements funds were exempted from
taxation and these funds were also exempt from any
previous debts or loans except those owed the federal
government or tribal government (Lawson 1982). Any
land not needed for the Oahe Dam project was to be
returned to the Standing Rock Lakota (although no lands
were returned); oil and gas were specifically included in
the mineral rights, and the tribe was given 60 days to
salvage property (Lawson 1982). They also faired better
in terms of their negotiating compensation.
The
Standing Rock tribe received $135,000 compared to the
Cheyenne River's $100,000. Also, the Standing Rock
tribe were not restricted in how these funds could be
used. The Cheyenne River tribe could not use more than
50010 for legal accumulated legal fees.
In the end, the losses suffered by the tribes far
outweighed any monetary gains they may have made in
the courts. The Fort Berthold tribes were severely
traumatized and never fully recovered from the loss of
their lands. The lives of all of the affected tribes were
Not having access to the rich
greatly affected.
bottomlands was detrimental to the very life of these
people. These areas provided them with free fuel and
timber for use in their homes. Loss of these wooded
areas forced into a cash economy rather than a
subsistence economy, further sapping their low incomes.
The bottomlands were also rich in wild plant life,
essential to the diets of these people. The gathering of
these fruits and vegetables is a practice which extends
well back into their history and which is a tradition in
their culture. The wild herbs and plants were used not
only for food, but for religious purposes as well. Loss of
these plants severely disrupted their religious practices
and ceremonies (Lawson 1982: Reisner 1986).
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The bottomlands also provided shelter during the hot
blazing sun of summer and protection from freezing
blizzards in the winter. Homes built on higher ground
required greater insulation due to the exposure of the
open plains; the people were no longer able to heat by
wood stoves. but were forced to seek other, more costly
fuels.
The wooded areas were abundant with wildlife which not
only supplemented the diets of the Native people, but
provided a source of income. The Pick-Sloan project
reduced the wildlife population by 75 percent, severely
restricting the available food source and income.
(Lawson 1982).
Ranching had become the primary means of income on
nearly all of the reservations. The inundation of the
prime rangeland had severe affects on Native ranchers.
Some ranchers were forced to liquidate and others had to
substantially reduce the size of their herds because of the
poor grazing lands, loss of natural shelter, lack of freely
available water and the requirement of fences to protect
the herds from the fluctuating waters of the reservoir.
People who had become self-sufficient and conformed to
a more sedentary life had the very fabric of their lives
ripped away again by the building of these massive dams.

CONCLUSION
In order to receive any form of compensation for the loss
of their homes and their lands, the Seneca tribe were
forced to submit a plan for their termination requested in
the rider attached to House Resolution 1794. For the
tribes along the Missouri, a more indirect approach was
taken in the form of destruction of their communities.
This forced many people to leave the reservation
altogether and, in many cases, destroyed their means of
subsistence. While the reservations along the Missouri
did not have a direct request for termination, the
devastation to their reservations amounted to the demise
of their culture. One wonders whether some politicians
and others found the dams a convenient means of further
destroying the Native American culture.
More recently, there have been some gains made by
tribes to protect their reservations and the destruction of
their culture. The Yavapai of Arizona were successful in
stopping the building of the Orme Dam in its original
location, thereby saving their reservation and blocking
their forced removal. Native American groups in the
Northwest have formed an organization to protect their
fishing rights along the Columbia River, and the tribes
along the Missouri have formed the Mni Sose Intertribal
Water Rights Coalition, an organization to protect
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themselves from losing further lands and to protecting
their water rights. Native Americans need to stay
informed and to organize to protect themselves from
further encroachment on their lands by dams and
reservoirs, and to protect their water rights granted to
them in the numerous treaties made with the US
Government.
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TABLE 1. Surface Water on Lands Under BfA Jurisdiction

TYPE OF WATER.

NUMBER

SURFACE
ACRES

Natural lakes and ponds
Reservoirs & impoundments

5,690

1,001,825

MILES

-

SHORE
LINE MILES
5,845

507,139
4,573
17,537
6,500
4,047
384
14,279
Perennial streams
330
349
39
Coastal
17,248
1,509,348
14,318
27,623
TOTAL
Source: Bureau ofIndzan Affairs Natural Resource InformatIOn System Inventory and ProductIOn Report, J989,
United States Department of the Interior, Report No. 55-38-X, p. 3. A dash (-) indicates no data given in original
source.
TABLE 2. Impact of The Pick-Sloan Project on Reservation Lands

Percentage
of Population

Type of land
Lost

35

16%

1/2 sheltered
pastureland

3,349

19

8%

9,514

84

34%

bottomland,
1/3 timber

Amount of
Acres Lost

Number of
Families
Relocated

22,091

136

Lower Brule

7,997

Yankton
Crow Creek

Ft. Randall
Dam

160,889

Oalte Dam
Standing Rock

55,994

170

25%

rangeland,
agricultural,
timber, wild
fruit, wildlife

Cheyenne River

104,420

180

30%

sla above

Lower Brule

14,609

62

53%

timber, pastureland, farms~
ranches

Crow Creek

6,417

27

11%

farms, ranches

152,360

349

80%

agricultural,
grazing land,
timber

Bi2 Bend

Garrison Dam
Ft. Berthold

Source: M. L. Lawson, Dammed Indians, 1982. Umversity of Oklahoma Press.
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Senecas To Be Flooded Out
1964 Senior Scholastic 84, 20 March:17-18.
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